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NOTES
will be capable of heeding the trial judge's admonition not to
give weight to the conviction. On the strength of these considera-
tions, it is submitted that, absent absolute necessity, 2 a refer-
ence by a prosecuting attorney on retrial to the conviction of the
accused by a previous petit jury should be treated as incurable
reversible error.
Closely related to this problem are the difficulties which arise
from the present practice of using the original indictment on re-
trial. Since the verdict rendered at the first trial is endorsed
upon the original indictment, the jury will usually become aware
of the former verdict through an examination of the indictment.
This could be avoided by adopting a procedure under which a
certified copy of the indictment would be used in a case in which
the accused has been convicted of the crime charged. If the con-
viction at the first trial is of a lesser crime than that charged,
it would probably be necessary to obtain a new indictment or a
new bill of information for the retrial, in order to change the
crime charged. 21 Another solution would be to make it the statu-
tory duty of the trial judge in such a case to amend the indict-
ment so as to charge the lesser crime. Under this proposed pro-
cedure, all knowledge of the former trial and verdict could be
kept from the jury and the objective of Article 515 would be
greatly furthered.
Daniel J. McGee
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-REVIEW OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION CASES
In an action brought in federal district court,' solely on the
basis of diversity of citizenship,2 plaintiff recovered for injuries
sustained in an oil field accident. Defendant appealed from
denial of motions for directed verdict and judgment non obstante
veredicto, and on exceptions to instructions to the jury. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that defendant's motion for
directed verdict should have been granted.3 Plaintiff petitioned
20. The only "absolute necessity" situation would appear to be that presented
in the Crittenden case, that is, a case in which the accused has-been convicted of
a lesser crime than that charged at a previous trial and it is necessary to explain
the implied acquittal theory to the present jury. A remedy to this problem Is
proposed in the following paragraph.
21. See note 7 aupra.
1. United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (unre-
ported).
2. Plaintiff was a citizen of Texas; defendant was incorporated under the.laws
of Delaware.
3. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Gibson, 232 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1956).
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the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In a
very brief per curiam opinion 4 the Court granted plaintiff's
writs, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, and re-
instated that of the district court. In reaching its decision
it was necessary for the Court to decide the question of error
in the instructions to the jury, an issue not considered by
the court of appeals, 5 and not discussed by the Supreme Court.
Four Justices dissented.6 In dissenting Mr. Justice Frankfurter
expressed disapproval of the Court's reviewing cases within the
federal judicial system solely because of diversity of citizenship
of the litigants. Gibson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 352 U.S. 874
(1956).
Diversity jurisdiction has been a highly controversial sub-
ject since its inclusion in the Constitution.7 The present pre-
requisites for the federal courts' exercise of diversity jurisdic-
tion are set out in 28 United States Code Section 1332.8 This
Note is concerned with the Supreme Court's review of cases
4. "Per Curiam. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment
of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the District Court is re-
instated."
5. In ruling that the motion for directed verdict should have been granted the
court of appeals never reached the question of errors in instructions. The Supreme
Court so stated in NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 304, n. 3 (1957).
6. Justices Reed and Burton would deny certiorari; Justice Harlan joined with
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting..7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, . . .between citizens of different States .... ." This provision was highly
contested during the period of ratification. It was supported by Wilson, in 2
ELLIOTS DEBATES 491 (1937); Pendleton, 3 ELLIOTs DEBATES 518 (1937);
Madison, 3 ELI 0Ts DEBATES 533 (1937); Marshall, 3 ELLIOTs DEBATES 556
(1937). It was opposed by Patrick Henry, in 3 ELLIOTS DEBATES 542 (1937) ;
Mason, 3 ELLIOTs DEBATES 523 (1937) ; Grayson, 3 ELLIOTS DEBATES 565 (1937).
The controversy is still very much alive. Present day advocates: Brown, The
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. REV.
179 (1929) ; Grinnell, The Bills Pending Before Congress to Repeal the Federal
Courts' Jurisdiction in Cases of Diversity of Citizenship, 30 MASS. L.Q. 21 (1945) ;
Shall Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction Be Abolished or Modified?, 30
J. AM. JUD. Soc. 169 (1947) ; Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent At-
tacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433 (1932). Among its adversaries are Collier, A
Plea Against Jurisdiction for Diversity of Citizenship, 76 CENTRAL L.J. 263
(1913) ; Shall Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction Be Abolished or
Modified?, 30 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 169 (1947) ; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial
Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORN. L.Q. 499 (1928) ; Mc-
Govney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARV. L. REV. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943).
8. "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
'where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000 exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between:
"(1) Citizens of different States ;
"(2) Citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
"(3) Citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof are additional parties.
(b) The word :'states', as used in this section, includes the Territories, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. As amended
July 26, 1956, c. 740, 70 Stat. 658."
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arising under these provisions, which is ordinarily achieved by
writs of certiorari, 9 rather than with the controversy over the
jurisdiction itself. Review by certiorari assumed its present
position of importance in 1891 when the intermediate appellate
courts were created to relieve a seriously over-burdened Supreme
Court docket.'0 In several areas, including diversity jurisdiction
cases, the decisions of these courts were intended to be "final"'"
in that they were to be subject only to discretionary review by
the Supreme Court.12 Review on writs is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion. s An application will normally
be approved when four Justices consider the case meritorious.14
The Court has indicated generally, by rule15 and decision, the
considerations governing the granting of writs. It has been
clearly stated that writs will issue only for special and important
reasons0 of public rather than merely private concern. 17 One
9. Review in the greatest majority of cases is by writs of certiorari under 28
U.S.C. § 1254 (1948). There is also the possibility of review by certfication. Prior
to 26 STAT. 826 (1891), under 18 STAT. 316 (1875), parties in a diversity case
had the right of appeal when the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000.
10. 26 STAT. 826 (1891), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-94 (1948). This overload had
become a serious problem which the Supreme Court viewed as "one of great peril."
Forsythe v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 512 (1897). In 1890 there were 1200 cases
backlogged and a span of four years existed between docketing and final argu-
ment and decision. Remarks of Senator Evart, 21 CONG. REC. 10220 (1890). The
relief was achieved by transferring much of the former obligatory review to the
realm of discretionary review.
11. 26 STAT. 826, 828 (1891); American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville
R. W. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 382 (1893) (opinions final except in extraordinary
eases).
12. 26 STAT. 826, 828 (1891) ; Colombia v. Cauca Co., 190 U.S. 524 (1903)
Senator Vest's remarks, 21 CONG. REC. 10224 (1890).
13. Sup. Ct. Rev. Rules 19(1) ; Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S.
202 (1938) ; Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62 (1905) ; In re Tampa Suburban R.R.,
168 U.S. 583.(1897).
14. Mr. Justice Stone, Fifty Years Work of the United States Supreme Court,
14 A.B.A.J. 428, 436 (1928). Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Senator
Wheeler in S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 40 (1947) : "Furthermore,
petitions for certiorari are granted if four Justices think they should be. A vote
by a majority is not required in such cases. Even if two or three of the justices
are strongly of the opinion that certiorari should be allowed, frequently the other
Justices will acquiesce in their view, but the petition is always granted if four so
vote."
15. Sup. Ct. Rev. Rules 19.
16. Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955) ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315 (1943) (writs granted for benefit of the judicial system) ; Ohio
ex rel. Seney v. Swift and Co., 260 U.S. 146 (1922).
17. Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955) (court not sitting for
the benefit of the particular litigants) ; Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well
Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923) (Writs not granted "except in cases in-
volving principles the settlement of which is of importance to the public as dis-
tinguished from that of the parties") ; Chief Justice Taft, The Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court:Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1925)
("The function of the Supreme Court is conceived to be not the remedying of a
particular litigant's wrong, but the consideration of cases whose decision involves
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such reason is the necessity for a uniform application of the law
by the courts of appeals.' The existence of a "federal common
law" during the reign of the Swift v. Tyson 9 doctrine made it
necessary to grant writs frequently, in diversity cases, to achieve
this uniformity. However, the repudiation of that doctrine has
obviated this requirement. 20  In those cases in which a federal
court's jurisdiction is based solely on the citizenship of the par-
ties the court is considered merely an additional state court and
applies local law as interpreted by state tribunals.2' Another
situation warranting the granting of writs arises when a court
of appeals has decided an important state or territorial question
in a manner conflicting with state or territorial law.22 This, of
course, has specific application to diversity cases. However, in
the instant case it would not appear that any important state
question was involved or that the outcome of the litigation was
of public rather than private concern.
principles, the application of which is of wide public or governmental interest,
and which should be authoritatively declared by the final court.").
18. Warner v. New Orleans, 167 U.S. 467, 474 (1897): "In order to guard
against any injurious results which might flow from having nine appellate courts,
acting independently of each other, power was given to this court to bring before
it for decision by certiorari any case pending in either of those courts. In that way
it was believed that uniformity of ruling might be secured, as well as the disposi-
tion of cases whose gravity and importance rendered the action of the tribunal of
last resort peculiarily desirable."
19. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). The First Judiciary Act, 1 STAT. 73, § 34
(1789), had established that local law was to be applied in diversity cases. The
Court refused to apply this section on grounds that it did not extend to contracts
or instruments of a commercial nature. This began 96 years of a continuous de-
velopment of the "federal common law."
20. The renunciation of this doctrine came after many years of a slow buildup
of dissatisfaction in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Of note is the
fact that the Court overruled a precedent of almost a century's standing which
had not been contested by counsel. The Court stated (id. at 77) that "the In-
justice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson have been re-
peatedly urged as reasons for abolishing or limiting diversity of citizenship juris-
diction . . . . If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should
not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a cen-
tury. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear,
and compels us to do so." (Emphasis added.) It would appear that this is the
only time that the Supreme Court has considered one of its own actions as un-
constitutional. In Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938), the
court stated that in questions controlled by state law, conflict among circuits
alone is not of itself reason for granting writs.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945) ; Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S.
270 (1940) (federal courts are bound to follow the decisions of the highest state
court) ; Six Co. v. Highway District, 311 U.S. 180 (1940) (if the highest court
has not acted, the interpretation of intermediate courts must be followed) ; cf.
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
22. Sup. Ct. Rev. Rules 19(1). Former Rule 38(5) (B), which covered this sub-
ject, stated that writs would be granted when the decision of the court of appeals
was probably in conflict with local law. Presently writs are to be granted when
the decision is in conflict. Some significance apparently should be given to this
change.
NOTES
In dissenting, Mr. Justice Frankfurter viewed this case as
an "ordinary suit for damages" in which no overriding ques-
tion of policy was presented. In pointing out the dangers of
granting writs in such suits he noted that an investigation of
local law must be made to determine whether the court of ap-
peals erred. This could readily lead to the Supreme Court's
sitting to determine the local law of each of the forty-eight
states, an activity certainly incongruous with the Court's pri-
mary function of resolving important matters of federal con-
cern. Cases adjudicated by the federal courts solely because of
diversity of citizenship of the parties are placing an increasing
burden on these courts.2 8  These apprehensions of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter seem well founded.
In addition to the problem presented above, a further dif-
ficulty arises from the use made of the per curiam opinion in
the instant case. Per curiam opinions, ever an instrument of
expedition, once reflected unanimity of the Court. This is no
longer the case.2 4 Nevertheless, use of the per curiam today
makes it easier to give the stamp of finality to litigation with
a minimum of time and effort. Normally the device is used to
dispose of cases concerning well-settled principles of law not
requiring full consideration. Often references are made to prior
decisions, as is exemplified by the treatment accorded recent
segregation cases. 25 The ordinary diversity case does not lend
itself readily to such summary disposition, for in the absence of
. 23. In recent years there has been a marked increase of private civil cases in
federal courts solely because of diversity jurisdiction. In 1941 there were 7,286
cases; in 1951 there were 13,474; and in 1955 there were 19,123. See Report of
the Judicial Conference for these years. A recent measure, highly contested, but
supported by both the Judicial Conference (REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
15 (Sept. 1952) ) and the Attorney General of the United States (REPORT OF TIlE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 39 (Sept. 1955) ) is an increase in the jurisdictional amount
from the present $3,000.00 to $10,000.00. See I-.R. REP. Nos. 5007, 7203, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3072, 1.0109 (1955).
24. Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319 (1902). The
Court in this case was speaking of a per curiam opinion rendered in Smoot v.
Ritterhouse, decided January 10, 1876. The Smoot decision was unreported, as
were many per curiams prior to 1900, but a copy may be found in 27 Wash. L.
Rep. 741 (1899). This unanimity of the court is no longer present in all per
curiams. Dissents have increased in recent years. In 1943 there was only one case
with a dissent; in 1944 there were 4 with dissents, 14 in 1952, and 18 in 1955.
Use of the per curiam device has also increased considerably. During the 1953 term
86 cases were so disposed, 23 after oral argument; in 1954, 102 cases, 16 after
oral argument (REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 85 (Sept. 1955)). In the
1955 term 127 per curiams rendered, 7 after oral argument. The Supreme Court
1955 Term, 70 HARv. L. REV. 83, 99 (1956).
25. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 350 U.S. 413
(1956) ; Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) ; Tureaud v. Board of
Supervisors, Louisiana State University and Agric. and Mech. College, 347 U.S.
971 (1954).
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a clear conflict with local law there may be neither a well-settled
principle of law nor decisions available for reference. In the
instant case the Court resolved questions concerning instruc-
tions to the jury not passed on by the court of appeals,26 and
denied itself and counsel the benefits of briefs and oral argu-
ment. The Court assigned no reason for its action, leaving the
parties uninformed as to the basis upon which their rights were
adjudicated. Such a situation may easily lead to confusion as
to the state of the law, 27 and lower federal court judges may
encounter difficulty in determining a course of action in similar
cases. One Texas appellate court has chosen to ignore the Su-
preme Court's reversal of the court of appeals in the instant
case and to cite the latter with approval. 28 It is submitted that
except in extraordinary instances the judgments of the courts of
appeals in diversity cases should be left undisturbed. If a case
is of such a nature as to warrant consideration by the Supreme
Court, a full disposition should be accorded. If, however, the
Court finds it necessary to resort to the per curiam device, it is
submitted that some indication should be given as to the legal
principles upon which the decision is founded.
Henry A. Politz
INSURANCE - AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE - CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE TERM "INSURED" IN EMPLOYEE AND
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EXCLUSIONS
Mitchell, while loading Southern's truck, negligently killed
an employee of Southern, the name insured in a liability policy
on the truck. Plaintiff, spouse of deceased, sued Employer's
Liability Assurance Corporation as the insurance carrier on the
26. See note 5 supra.
27. Mr. Justice McReynolds, Hearing8 Before Committee by Judiciary on H. R.
8206, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1925) : "To me it seems that the real function of
our Court is this: to settle the law, so that lawyers may know how to advise their
clients and so that trial judges may know how to instruct their juries or how to
decide cases that come before them."
28. Nance Exploration Co. v. Texas Employers' Ins. Assoc., unreported, 1957:
"True it is that the Supreme Court of the United States, in a very recent per
curiam opinion (1 L. Ed.2d 77), without giving any rhyme or reason for its ac-
tion, set aside the holding of the Circuit Court in this case .... It is impossible
to determine from the Supreme Court opinion why it took this action. It cannot
be determined if it thought the Texas law was wrong, or if it thought that the
Fifth Circuit had wrongly applied it. Be that as it may, we are not bound by
Federal decisions in this case. On the contrary, Federal courts are supposed to
follow State decisions . . . . We consider the Fifth Circuit opinion well reasoned
and in accord with the Texas decisions, by which we are governed. Federal cases
are used by us as persuasive, but not decisive. In this case, we choose to cite with
approval the Fifth Circuit's opinion."
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